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This paper develops aquantitative general equilibrium model to assess the
growth effects of adopting a flat tax plan similar to the one proposed by Hall and
Rabushka (1985, 1995). Using parameters calibrated to match the progressivity
of the U.S. federal tax schedule and other features of the U.S. economy, we find
that a revenue neutral flat tax can permanently increase per capita growth by
0.18 to 0.85 percentage points per year. Both features of a flat tax—the lower
marginal tax rate and the full invest ment write-off-are important contributors
to the growth gain. The strength of the growth effect depends on: (1) the
elastici~ of household labor supply, (2) capital’s share of output, and (3) the
elasticity of the capital stock with respect to new investment.1 Introduction
Since its inception in 1913, the U.S. federal income tax system has grown enormously,
in terms of the revenues raised, and the shear number of pages and complexity of
the Internal Revenue Service code. The system has been accused of costing the LJ.S.
economy billions of dollars in lost output each year because of the perverse way that
it affects people’s incentives to work, save, invest, and take entrepreneurial risks.
On top of that, taxpayers must spend huge numbers of hours learning about and
complying with rules that are described as being too complicated for the ordinary
citizen to understand.
Criticisms such as these have led to calls for a simpler and more efficient federal
income tax. One of the most widely discussed proposals for achieving this goal is a
s~called flat tax. The basic idea of a flat tax is to have only one tax rate which applies
to all taxable income. This contrasts sharply with the current system which has five
tax rates ranging from 15 to 39.6 percent, each applied to a different increment of
income. The current system is often described as “progressive” because the marginal
tax rat~the rate applied to tll[’ last dollar of incomegoes up as one’s income
rises. A flat tax can also exhibit fratures that are progressive, however, through the
appropriate use of a standard ~wrs(j]lal deduction.
In addition to having only f~I]e rate, allother key feature of a flat tax is the
definition of taxable irlcome. ‘1’llt l,lLdmlying principle is that individuals should
be taxed on u’hat tll~’y take 011{ ()f t11( cct)llomy (consumption), and not what they
put in (savings or invcstmerlt ). ‘1’11(1 {’ffec[ of a consumption tax can be achieved by
allowing investmt’nt rx])(vldit llr(’~ t~) IN’ flllly (Icciucted, or “written-off,” from taxable
income. This (I1l}laIl(.(,sall(i sirl]l)lili(>> (11(,variety of investment incentives that am
built into tllc cllrr(ml sysl(~]li, .. II(d I iis ;i(x.(~]er-at,ecl depreciation schedules, partial
interest deduct il)ility. aI)(i so (III.
The curmn[ (l(~l)iit(, (nw ii 11:11 t;Ix lIiis lWIJII stimulated in large measure by Hall
and Rab\lshka ( 1!)S3, l!~!)~)).1~11{, (I(wril)( lll(~ir flat tax proposal in very simple tm-rns
arid work out ttIc I)rii(”ti(:al (l(~t iiils II(YX1(Y1 for its implementation. Hall and Rabushb
argue that thr ac{ol)l it)ll ~)f :1 ll:iI I:1x u’{)111(1givr an enormous boost to the U.S.
1economy by dramatically improving incentives to engage in productive activities and
would save taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars in compliance and administration
costs.
In this paper, we develop a quantitative general equilibrium model to assess the
growth effects of a adopting a flat tax plan similar to the one proposed by Hall and
Rabushka. The framework for our analysis is a simple endogenous growth model in
which the progressivity of the tax schedule is summarized by a single parameter. This
parameter captures the way in which agents’ incentives to consume, work, and invest
are influenced by rising marginal tax rates. Relative to a progressive tax system,
we find that a flat tax leads to an increase in labor hours, income, and investment
(or savings). The initial impact on consumption is ambiguous: there is a positive
effect due to an increase in income, but a negative effect due to a lower marginal
propensity to consume. However, since labor hours and investment are the driving
forces for growth in our model, a flat tax raises the economy’s long-run growth rate,
and hence! long-run consumption. This results in large welfare gains.
Our model builds on the recent work of Stokey and Rebelo (1995) who use an
endogenous growth framework to identify the key model features and parameters that
are important for determining the quantitative impacts of tax reform on growth.1 Our
analysis differs from theirs in two fundamt=nta] respects.
First, we evaluate the grolvth effects of switching from a progressive tax to a
flat tax. In doing so, we consider tllc gains attributable to both the lowering of the
marginal tax rate and tile fllll writtwjfi’ of irlw’strncnt expenditures. Stokey and Rebelo
consider only tax systems in wllicll t}](~mar~irlal tax rate is equal to the average tax
rate. Moreover, wllilr their :illiil)”>is t’Xillllirl(S t }1(’ impact of a depreciation allowance,
t}lcy do not consider a fllll it]v(,5t111~’1]1 lvriltw)fr.
!+cond, hllrrlarl capital it] (Jilr [II()(1(’]ac({lrn{llates via a “learning by doing” exter-
rlality instead of throllgh diret”t itlvt’s[ 11](’1)((wperlditllres by households. Our formu-
Iatiotl implies [Ilat }I(}llsol]i)l(ls I]ll[i(’ririv{’sl ill }lllIIlarl ca~)ital relative to the socially
‘ SOrm ot}lcr rcsmrch that consicltw thr cfrrcts ()( tax rcf(m[r] on ~rmvth includes King and Rebelo
( 1!)!10), Lucas ( 1990), Rcimh) ( l!~!ll ), I’fw,r)ri,, ( I!X1:{, 1!)94), .Jorles, ManuelIi, and Rossi (1993),
Ikwmwrx and L(w ( 1994), and (~l(m]rll aIIIl Ikfi!illrl)ar ( I!w6), among others.opt imal level. This tends to magnify the growth effects of reforms that affect invest-
ment incentives. In a sensitivity analysis, we investigate the impact of the learning
by doing externality on the computed growth gains.
Using parameters calibrated to match the progressivity of the U.S. federal tax
schedule and other features of the U.S. economy, we quantify the growth effects of
a flat tax. In switching from a progressive tax system to a flat tax, we impose a
condition of revenue neutrality. A flat tax results in a lower marginal tax rate, but
requires a higher average tax rate to pay for the more generous writeoff and deduction
features. This mitigates the resulting growth benefits.
In our experiments, we find that a flat tax can permanently increase per capita
growth by 0.18 to 0.85 percentage points per year. Both features of a flat tax—the
lower marginal tax rate and the full investment write-off-are important contributors
to the growth gain. The lower marginal tax rate accounts for about two-thirds of
the gain, while the full write-off accounts for one-third. We show that the strength
of the growth effect depends on: (1) the elasticity of household labor supply, (2)
capital’s share of output, and (3) the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to
new invest ment.
For a baseline set of parameters, a flat tax increases annual per capita growth by
0.74 percentage points, from 1.80 percent to 2.54 percent. This growth effect is well
within the range of values that have been cited in the public debate surrounding a
fiat tax. For example, former presidential candidate Steve Forbes argued that a flat
tax would increase growth by 2 percentage points or more per year. Alvin Rabushka
has asserted that annual growth would increase by 1 percentage point or more for
at least seven years. Robert Rarro estimates that annual growth would increase by
roughly O.-1percentage points.2
Some words of calltion regar(lit~g the interpretation of our results are in order.
First, althol]gh our model provides a theoretical framework for evaluating claims
regarding the growth benefits of ii flat tax, the empirical evidence regarding the links
‘Sources for t}msc figures arc .a.sfollms: ‘1’hr WaU .W-ed Jouma~ January 29, 1996, page A- 1,
column 5 (Iporlws), ‘1’hr Nrw York ‘1’tnlr.s, January 23, 1996, page A-1 1, column 1 (Ilal)ushka), and
7’hc Wall Strwi JOUT-UUL I;vlwuary 22, I!J!M, pa.gc A- 14, column 4 (Barre).between tax policy and long-run growth are inconclusive.3 Second, our results, like
those of Stokey and Rebelo (1995), show that the effects of tax reform on growth
are sensitive to the choice of parameter values. Third, since our model abstracts
from stochastic shocks, we allow no role for progressive taxes to serve as potentially
beneficial automatic stabilizers. 4 Fourth, our highly stylized model assumes that all
households are ident ital. Thus, while our model can address issues of efficiency and
growth, it cannot be used to evaluate questions of distribution and fairness. What
can be said in this regard is that by enlarging the entire social pie, a higher growth
rate may provide significant benefits even to those who hold smaller shares of the pie.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 derives the household decision rules and shows how the tax system influ-
ences economic incentives and the per capita growth rate. Section 4 describes how
we calibrate our model to capture various features of the U.S. economy. Section 5
presents our quantitative results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of a large number of identical, infinitely-lived households
that operate in competitive markets, and the government. Each household operates
a firm that produces goods which are sold in the market. Households make decisions
abollt how much to consume, work, and invest over their lifetimes. In doing so,
they take into account the way in which the tax system affects their earnings. The
govern ment sets tile rules that govern the tax system. Tax revenues collected from
hfN]scholds are used to finance public expenditures. In what follows, we describe each
of these feat Ilres of the economy in more detail.
“SW Irclnn(i ( 1!19.[)for a review {,( thr cml~irical cvicfence.
4Sre Nlilirr ( 1!H+4) for a mwicl t}mt a(itiresws t}lis ismc.2.1 Households
The household’s decision problem can be formulated as choosing {et, lt, ,gt, zt, Ict+l, ‘rt}&
in order to maximize
~p’ln(ct - Bhtl:) , 8=(0,1), B>o, ~>1, (1)
t=o
subject to
ct+zt=yt –Tt(yt–@zt– Dt), @= [0,1], (2)
w = Aok: (htlt) ’-e , A. >0, Qc (0,1], (3)
kt+l = Alk~-6if, Al >0, 6 E (O, 1], ko given, (4)
~t = E’(y~, it) , (5)
where ~ is the discount factor, ct is consumption, lt is hours worked, and ht is an
index of knowledge (or human capital) which is outside of the household’s control.
Equation (2) is the household’s within-period budget constraint, where it is in-
vestment (or savings), yt is pre-tax income and ~t is the income tax rate. Taxable
income is given by yt —@it — Dt ~where @ is the fraction of investment expenditures
that can be “expensed” or written-off from taxable income, and Dt is the standard
deduct ion which households take as given. For comparison with U.S. tax law, @ can
he viewed as an index number that summarizes the various elements of the tax code
that encourage investment. For our purposes, the most important of these is the
capital depreciation allowance.5
\Ve model households as entrepreneurs WI1Ooperate a constant-returns-to-scale
production technology (3) by supplying their own physical capital ktl and labor effort
/(. ‘rhe household’s level of know~ledgc h~ allgrnents the productive capacity of each
}Itmr spent working, such that h,l~ repmscnts t}le effective labor input for production.
The utility function (1) can be “interpreted as the reduced form of one that in-
corporates home production $ Tllr presenm of /L~in both (1) and (3) implies that
[)r( dl]ctivity in the home and prt)(tllf:t ivily in tllr market increase at the same rate.
“In t}]e past, other incentives have included the investment tax credit for equipment purchases
and the tax-favored treatment of capital gains. Iloth of these were repealed by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986.
‘iScc C;rcenwood, Rogcrson, and M’right ( 19$)5).
<5As a result, lt remains stationary along the model’s balanced growth path. The pa-
rameters B and ~ affect the supply of market labor, where A is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply. As -y becomes large, lt approaches 1.0 and
the model reduces to one with a fixed supply of labor.
Investment adds to the stock of physical capital according to the law of motion (4),
where Al and 6 are parameters that govern the relationship between new investment
and next period’s capital stock. When AI = 1 and 6 = 1, capital depreciates fully
after one period, whereas O <6 < 1 implies that capital is long lasting. This nonlinear
specification facilitates closed-form decision rules and can be viewed as reflecting
adjustment costs as in Lucas and Prescott (1971 ).7
Following Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), we assume that the mechanism for
knowledge accumulation is learning by doing. This means that knowledge grows pro-
portionally to, and as a by-product of, accumulated private investment and research
act ivit ies. This idea can be captured by the specification ht = Kt, where Kt is the
average stock of capital across households. The assumption that households view
ht as outside of their control requires that there be a sufficiently large number of
households so that no single household can affect the value of Kt. However, since all
households are identical, Kt = kt in equilibrium. We therefore impose the condition
ht = Kt = /ctafter households make their optimal allocation decisions.
Equation (5) says that in decicii ng how much to earn and invest, households also
determine their tax rate according to the function F(yt, it), which we specify more
completely below.
‘This specification ha.. Iwmi used in a]qdicd work by }lercowitz and Sampson ( 1991), Kocherlakota
and Yi ( 1994), and Cassou and l,ansin~ ( 19!)5), among others. Our setup differs from the standard
onc given by: k,+,=- (1 - ~) k, + t,. w},,re ~ is the linear depreciation rate. Equation (4) can also be
viewed as capturing the behavior of iill aggregate stock that is rne.amrred by adding up different types
of capital (structures, equi I]nlcnt, cf)nslll!icr d[]ral~l(s, etc. ) which each display different depreciation
characteristics. Moreover, cal>ital st{wk {iat;l C(]rnI]ilml I>y the U.S. Department of Commerce in Fixed
f{eprvducible Tangible Wealth m (he (Iut(d .S(drs includes a “capital input” series. This alternatiw
mea..ure of the net stock cm]d~s a dcprcciati, )r) sc})mlulc that is slower than straight line during the
early .ycars of an asset’s Iifc, Inlt rrl{)rf. ra])i<l [Illring later years.2.2 The Tax System





Yt – @It – .Q ‘
(6)
where Yt and It are the average levels of income and investment in the economy, and
? G [0, 1) and n 2 0 are parameters that govern the level and progressivity of the tax
schedule. As with -Kc, households view the economy-wide averages as outside their
control, and we impose the equilibrium conditions Y~= yt and It = it after decisions
are made. When n > 0, households with above average taxable income face a higher
tax rate than those with below average taxable income. In contrast, when n = O,
all households face the same tax rate 7 regardless of their taxable income. In our
model, therefore, n > 0 represents a progressive tax schedule, while n = O represents
a horizontal or “flat” tax schedule.
Since we do not consider a separate corporate income tax, our evaluation of a
flat tax does not capture any benefits from eliminating the double taxation of capital
income. Offsetting this, however. is the fact that the in~’estment write-off in our
model is applied to the personal tax schedule, ~vhich is more progressive than the
corporate tax schedule. This tends to magnify the benefits of a larger write-off.
We also note that the investmerlt ~rrite-off irl our model applies to expenditures
for both physical and hllmarl capital --since tllmr is nothing to differentiate the two
in a learrlirlg-l)y-doirlg framework. 111 ci)rn~)arist)ri. tl~e 1Ian and Rabushka plan allows
for the write-off of expenditures f)tl pllysica] capital, bllt not for private individuals’
cxperlditures 011 education. 1’(J tll( (Jxterlt that tlicsc education expenditures con-
triblltc to the stock of hllrmirl [’a~lit;il. tt]{ II;lll arlci Ral)llshka plan does not go far
cIkoug}l irl ddillirlg ttl(~Lyp(’s of sl)tvl(lill: tli;il (Illalify as investment .8 In this respect,
ollr setup can bc viwd as arl i(i(’alixmi v(~rsiorl of a flat tax in which all types of
irlv(’strrwnt (ll~aiif)” for t}l(’ lvril(w~lf’.
‘1’11(~ gm’crnmcrlt stits l}l(J s(arl(liir(l (l(~ill(ti(}]l /)(, wllicll wc model as a constant
.lll[ 1(1 ( l!)!)(i)
i-fraction of average pre-t ax income:
where a ~ O. Since
deduction as given.
Dt = clYt, (7)
Dt is a function of Yt (as opposed to yt), households take this
As we shall see, the tax system in this model has an important influence on how
much households consume, work, and invest. For our analysis, it will be useful to
distinguish between the average tax rate and the marginal tax rate. The average tax
rate is defined as taxes paid Tt divided by the household’s taxable income Vt—@zt– Dt.
The marginal tax rate is defined as the change in taxes paid divided by the change
in taxable income, where we interpret “change” as an infinitesimally small amount.
Intuitively, the marginal tax rate represents the rate applied to the last dollar earned.
The expressions that govern the various tax rates are as follows:
- (Yt – @it - l)t)~+’ Taxes paid = T~ = ~~(:y~– Oit – Dt) = ~
(K - @I, - D,)n ‘
(8)




Marginal tax rat(’ =
8Tt
= (n+ I) T,. (lo)
i~(j~f – @it – D~)
In equilibrium, W}lCII l’; = !/, i~r)(! ]( = it. MT have Tt = T, so that the average tax
rate is ? and the marginal tax r:it(’ is (TI + 1) ~. tl%en 71 > 0, the marginal tax rate is
greater than the m’eragc tax rii[ (’. ~v}iif:ll iln[)lies that the tax schedule slopes up as a
function of taxal)le i]m)m~’. lti (( )[11rasl. \vll(vl 71= O. the two tax rates are the same,
which implies that ([it’ lax st”ll~.{tlll(’is (I:tl. .\lfmwver, when n = O and @ = 1, a flat
tax is equivalent to OIICL tl)ii~ (;ix(’s (I ,Ilsll]!l])t i(~nat the rate Tc = *.9
It is important 10 r(m JgIliz, [II;i[ ii Ililt tax call still exhibit features which are
progressive. The f.-rllci:il (’I(L1lK’[1(I11:1(:Ili’errls t}w progmssivity of a f~at tax is the
lmwl of the standard dmillct it)1) /),. ‘Ii) s{~’ this, consider an alternative tax rate
‘In this case, the eqllilil)riun) ~,r~lt~ll (If tt,(’ hollsctmld budget constraint (2) can be written a..:
f, + T,(ct —D, )+ 1, gr. Wlwr{> (f, – l), ) rq)rf~~mt.s t;lXill~lc consumption expenditures.









If we assume that the standard deduction is held fixed at a specific dollar amount,
say ~, for all tax payers (as is the case under the U.S. tax code), then the ratio R
declines as income yt rises. If we further assume that the ratio ~ remains constant,
then equation (11 ) says that the tax rate ~ will rise with income. In other words,
households with higher incomes face higher tax rates—a feature that is progressive. 10
In our model, the standard deduction is not held fixed, but instead rises with
the average level of income, as given by (7). This formulation ensures that the
standard deduction continues to represent a significant fraction of income in this
growing economy.
(
Substituting (7) into (11) yields ~ = 7 1 – ~ – ~ , which
)
shows that households with above average incomes (yt > Yt) continue to face higher
tax rates than those wit h below average incomes (yt < Yt), even when n = O (again
assuming that $ remains constant).
2.3 Public Expenditures
The government sets the tax code parameters 7, n, ~, and a to finance a required level
of per capita public expenditures Rt which do not contribute to either production or
household lltility. 1‘ We assume that the government balances its budget period-by-
period such that its budget constraint is given by
Rt = Tt(Yt – @lt – Dt) . (12)
Pm capita pllblic expmlditllrrs are assumed to increase in fixed proportion to the
average level of income in tile economy, such that Rt = VYt~ where @ > 0. Again> this
formulation ensures that pllblic cxpertditurm remain a significant fraction of output
as the economy grows.
‘ ‘)FCN rrmrr details orl a Twogrw+iw Ihit tax, wc liall and Ruhushka ( 1995), chapter 3.
‘‘ CAlr growth c{,rni)utations remain unaf~ected if public expenditures enter the utility function (1)
in an additiwly scparahlc way.3 Incentive Effects of the Tax System
In this section, we show how the tax system affects household decisions and the
economy’s per capita growth rate.
3.1 Household Decisions
The household’s first-order conditions with respect to the indicated variables are:




= B-fhtl:-’(c, - mtl:)-’ , (14)
A++l : &[l-@(n+l)Tt] =
{
(1 -Q&+l [~-@(n+ 1)7,+1] !(15)
,?h+l & [1 - (n+ 1)7,+,]+
ak~+l 1
where At is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (2). A con-
venient property of the utility function (1) is that lt can be solved for independently
of the marginal utility of consumption At. By combining (3), (13), and (14), and then
imposing the equilibrium conditions Y~ = y~, 1~ = it, and ht = Kt = /ct,we obtain
the following optimal decision rule for household labor hours:
_
/, = AO(l– O)
{ }
e+~–1
B7 [1-(rr+l)T] . (16)
By sllbstituting (16) into (3)
(f~r olltput) can be written as:
and again imposing equilibrium, per capita income
(17)
“1’{)<~ht,airlthe optimal decisi{)rl rl]lrs for household consumption and investment,
W(S~~rr]l)]~)y the method of llrl{i(~tc’rr]lill(x! coefficients. First, we guess the following
fllllcl iollal forms for it and Af :
[
l–(n+ l)?





where a. and b. are constants to be determined and yt is given by (17). Substituting





where p G ~ — 1 is the household’s rate of time preference and a. can be interpreted
as the marginal propensity to save out of after-tax income. Since ~ is a constant,
the analysis of section 2.2 indicates that our flat tax specification will continue to
exhibit features which are progressive. The investment decision rule (18) can also be
written as it = a. (1 —-rZ ) yt, where ~i is the effective tax rate on investment which is
l–f#J n+l 7 @ven by ~i = ll_@~\+l); “ Notice that when @ = 1, we have -ri= O.
The next step is to verify that (19) is a correct guess by showing that b. is, in
fact, a constant. To do this, we use (13) and (19) to obtain
Ct = boyt + Bhtl; ,
= boyt+~[l –(n+l)?]yt, (21)
where the second equality replaces Bhtlj by an equivalent expression that is obtained
by combining (13) and (14). Substituting (7), (18), and (21) in~o the household
budget constraint (2) yields





which is a constant and thus verifies our original guess. Finally, substituting the








where the coefficient on ,y~can be interpreted as the household’s marginal propensity
to consllmc,
‘l’he decision rules for 1(, ;yt, it. anti ~;t illustrate some important points regarding
the incentive effects of the tax system. Notice that all of these decision rules depend
on the slope parameter 71, w}licl} ct)ntrols the progressivity of the tax schedule. For
11a given value of 7, equation (16) says that a reduction in n (which makes the tax
schedule flatter) will lead to an increase in labor hours.*2 Since labor hours are
used to produce goods which are sold in the market, equation (17) says that per
capita income will also rise. A reduction in n leads to higher investment in two
ways: by lowering the effective tax rate Ti, and by increasing yt. Equation (23) shows
that the immediate effect of a reduction in n on consumption is ambiguous: there
is a positive effect due to the increase in yt, but a negative effect due to the lower
marginal propensity to consume.
In general, the immediate effect of larger write-off fraction # is to raise investment
13 Neither labor hours, income, or investment are affected and lower consumption.
by the parameter a, which determines the level of the standard deduction Dt. In
contrast, household consumption depends posit ively on a.
In equilibrium, the term ~~Dt in the household budget constraint can be written as
?a~t. This term can be interpreted as tax revenues which are returned to households
in the form of lump-sum transfers. Equation (23) shows that these transfers are
wholly consumed.
3.2 The Per Capita Growth Rate
We now use the above results to show how the tax system influences economic growth
in our model. A simple expression for the economy’s per capita growth rate g can be
obt,ailled by substituting the decision rules for yt and it, ( 17) a]ld ( 18), into the law
of motion (4), and taking logarithms to obtain
(“+?.,) [ ( ~ ]n ]– rl+l)7_J – 6111[1–@(7t+l) ~]. (24)
Notice that g is constant over tilnr. wtlidl im~)lies that the economy is always in a
‘Z’l’his result cml hc ft,rrn:dly proved t,y (.xamining th{’ sign of the derivitiw ~ =
r
(0+, 1 ),1 (m. l)rl
1,. Since T > 1, wc kmxv that O t T – I > 0. I’hen if O < (n+ 1)7 < 1, we
have ~ <0.
’31t can he shown that when n >0 and O < (n t 1) T < 1,wc have & >0 and ~ <0.condition of balanced growth, i.e., our model exhibits no transition dynamics .14 The
growth effects of the individual tax code parameters 7, n, and@ are described by the
following derivatives:
ag –a(n+l) (1–d)~+d(l–e)[l–(~+1)~] < ~




(1-o) -f+d(l-q[l-(rl+l)q < ~




where the signs of the derivatives
> 0, (27)
are based on the assumption that @ c [0, 1] and
O < (n+ 1)? < 1. Holding everything else constant, equation (26) tells us that
a reform that makes the tax schedule flatter will reduce the slope parameter n and
thereby increase growth. Equation (27) shows that a more generous write-off fract ion
@ will also increase growt}l, The flat tax proposal of Hall and Rabushka (1985, 1995)
incorporates both of these changes. .Notice that the magnitude of the growth effects
are influenced by the parameters q, 0. and 6. The parameter -y controls the elasticity
of household labor supply, O is capital’s share of output, and 6 is the elasticity of the
capital stock with respect [(j ne]v illv(,st.ment.
An increase in either ; t)r O\villtallse ~ to become weaker, but will have no effect
on ~, An increase irl A tvill (alls(~ t),)(I1~ and ~ to become stronger. ]s The intuition
for these results is straig}ll f(lr~vart1. :\ larg(~r v:tl~lc of ~ implies that household labor
supply is less swlsiti~~t~II} cll:il]g(’> irl IIlc af((v--tax \\~age.A larger value of O reduces
the contribution of tll(’ lal)~~r ill;)llt (t) pr(xillct ion. Thus, both parameters impact
growth via the hih(lr 11( ~llrs (’1ltLrl!]I’1. ill (’()lltrast. b influences growth through the
investment channel. :1 l~ir~~,r\iill]t’ (,f A Ill(,:ii)s (}lat households devote more of their
income to invest remit i!lst(’:i(i of 1(, ~~)!lsllllll)tioll. This magnifies the impact of tax
“This is a general ttl;lr;i(t{,risLlt (If tr,{l(l:,If,(~[Is grimt Ii rtt,dels with a production technoloa that
is linear in k,. SW flarr(~ ari[l Sal:i-I-hl:irt IIl ( I{ I!I:J), (“hnljLcr 4.
“Formally, this car, lx, s},tnvl, 1,] IX: IIIIIIIIIIK t},, si~ris (,f the second derivatives & I ~ [ and
& I ~ 1. where I I rclmsrnt~ al,x,l,,t, V;,IU, ar,ti p, {-y, 0,6} . A positive (negative) second
derivitiw irnplics t}mt an im-rf,:w IrI L}l,. [~ar:trltrter will cause the growth effect to become stronger
(weaker).
1:1reforms that affect investment intent ives.
It can also be shown that ~ becomes stronger as n increases. This means that a
more generous write-off produces larger growth gains when applied to a steeper tax
schedule.
3.3 Revenue Neutrali@
The flat tax proposal of Hall and
intent of the plan is to improve
Rabushka is designed to be “revenue neutral.” The
economic efficiency while leaving aside arguments
about the appropriate size of government. Since tax reforms in our model affect
the trend growth of all variables, the concept of revenue neutrality used here is
necessarily a relative one. Specifically, we hold tax revenues constant relative to
the size of the economy. Given that tax revenues must finance public expenditures
according to Rf = r/~yt,revenue neutrality requires that U)remain unchanged as tax
code parameters are varied. By substituting equations (6), (7), and (18) into (12)
and imposing equilibrium, we obtain the following relationship among the tax code
parameters:
“’=’{ ]-oa” [11--$::::7! -a}-
(28)
In our experiments, a particular tax reform may cause n, d, and a to change.
Revenue neutrality is maintained by adjusting ? under the new system so that (28)
16 In general, adopting a flat tax requires a is satisfied at the pre-reform valllc of v!.
higher post-reform value of ? to pay for the more generous write-off and deduction
features. Since * <0 from equation (25). a higher value of f mitigates the resulting
growth benefits.
In the rmnaillin~ st,ctif)ns (J[ ~11{lnpcr. u’(>llnciertakc a qllantitative evaluation of
a flat tax in a calihra[ml versitlrl (lf I}1(’ rrltKI<’I.
4 Calibration
I’ararnct crs ar(> ;Lssig]led vall~w tmstxt or) eml)irically (~}mmwl features of the {J.S.
economy. For parameters th:it arr important to the results, a range of values is
]6Due to t}tc prcwlwe of an invest njrnt tax LafJcr cur-w-, there are actually two values of 7 that
satisfy t}lis re{ll]irerrlcI]t. \\’e pick tt]c, srn;~iler {lf the two in t~llr ql]ant.itatim experiments.
1.1examined.
A time period in the model is taken to be one year. The tax code parameters
7 and n are estimated from the 1994 U.S. tax schedule for married taxpayers filing
jointly. Figure 1 shows that there are five different marginal tax rates, ranging from
i 5 to 39.6 percent. These marginal tax rates are used to construct an average rate
schedule, which is also shown in figure 1.17
In figure 2, we plot the U.S. average tax rate versus the “income ratio,” which
we define as taxable income divided by its mean level. This ratio represents the
t–@it– Dt . empirical counterpart of the quantity ~~_ ~1~ _ ~t m our model. In constructing figure
2, we use a mean taxable income of $40,000. This number is based on tax return data
from 1992 (the most recent available). *8 A nonlinear least squares regression of the
average tax rate on the corresponding income ratio yields the following relationship:
Average Tax Rate = 0.1823 (Income Ratio) 0”2734.
Comparing the above expression to equation (6) yields T = 0.1823 and n =
0.2734.19 Figure 2 shows that the fitted relationship is flatter than the U.S. tax
schedule for income ratios between about 1.0 and 2.0, but steeper for income ratios
that fall into the lowest tax bracket. For the mean level of taxable income, the income
ratio is exactly 1.0 and the fitted relationship underestimates the progressivity of the
[T.S. tax schedule. This suggests that our calibration procedure yields a conservative
estimate of the growth benefits of adopting a flat tax.
The tax code parameter n is calibrated by dividing the total dollar ”amount of
17 ~(,r each level of income, the ~veragc tax rate is defined m total tax payments divided by total
taxable income. For example, a marrimi coupic whose total taxable income is $100,000 would pay
15 pcrrwnt cm the first $38,000 of their income, 28 percent on the next $53,850, and 31 percent on
thr remaining $8,150. This adds up to a total tax payment of $23,304.50, which corresponds to an
‘2:’”:’’)’’”50 x 100). ,avcr.agc tax rate of 23 ..3percent ( s, “,,,{)()[)
‘‘There were 41,577,964 joint returns fiicd in 19!12,whic}l accounted for a total taxable income uf
$1,653,210,099,000. Dividing the srxxm[i nunrher i,y the first yields a mean taxable income across all
joint returns of $39,762. See U.S. internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Irzrmme BrdletiT volume 15,
Summer 1995, table 3, p. 77.
1 ‘Gmvcia and Straus ( 1994) estimate U.S. average tax rates from 1979 to 1989 using a functional
{
form t})at emplws three parameters: Average ‘i’ax Rate T b 1– Is(Economic Income)p + 1]% ,
}
where ‘iFKonomic Income” is expressrxi ill thousands of ciollars. In our model, this specification woul(i
cause the asymptotic average ami rnar~inal tax rates to both equal b, since househoid income grows
over time.standard deductions taken in 1992 by GDP. This yields a = 0.06.20 The write-
off fraction @ is chosen such that the magnitude of the investment write-off ~@z
coincides with the value of a standard capital depreciation allowance ~tbkt, where we
,.
take ~ = 0.07. Given our target values of & = 2.6 and & = 0.22 (described below),
)
we obtain @ = 0.07 (~ = 0.8273.
Substituting the above values for ?, n, a, and @ into equation (28) yields @ =
0.1382. This means that tax revenues represent about 13.8 percent of output in our
model. Also with these values, we have ~~=
(1–d)(rl+l)r
l–@(n+l)7 = 0.0496, which shows that
the effective tax rate that governs the investment/saving decision under our cali-
bration is very low. This is probably a reasonable portrayal of current U.S. tax law
because a large fraction of U.S. savings is done through vehicles like pensions, Individ-
ual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), and 401k plans, which already receive consumption
tax trestment.21
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988), we choose ~ = 1.60 as our
baseline value, which implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor
supply * is equal to 1.7. As noted by these authors, this value lies about midway
in the range of the empirical elasticity estimates. We set capital’s share of output
equal to O = 0.36, which is within the range estimated by Christian (1988). Later,
in our sensitivity analysis, we will examine the effects of varying both ~ and 6.
Given the parameter values noted above, we simultaneously pick the remaining
five parameters .40, Al. & 1?, and Hso that the model’s balanced growth path displays
five characteristics identified from long-run 1~.S. data. The first characteristic is the
economy’s per capita growth rate which is set at 1.80 percent in order to coincide with
the postwar [ ‘.S. average. The swmd and third characteristics are the capital-output
rat it) : and the irl~’(>stmerlt-ollt~)ll~ratio ~. \Vc choose ~ = 2.6 and ~ = 0.22, again,
L(~coillcidc ~vith postw’ar 1“.S. aver: igcs. ‘z q’tle fourth characteristic is labor supply.
‘“ 1[] 1!)92, total stamlard deductions were $366.5 billion and nominal GDP was $6202 billion. See
[J.S. [r]tcrnal I<evrnllr Svrvicc, ,Stdrshr.s ojIrmrrw Bulletir~ vo]umc 15, Summer ] 995, table 7, p.
I(;0, an{l /;co710rmc Report of the PwsdcTIL I!)!15, table B-1, p. 274.
:] \Vr w-k!}, m,icdgc [till ~;alc and Iivrl Judd for making this point.
21”1’}1(.smnple period is 1954 h, 19!)2. ‘l’he series for k, and it include busines equipment and
strllcturc>, ronsurncr durables, and residential components, in 1987 dollars, from Fixed Reproducible
Tanqlblc lVrdth ~n Ihc ilnited .~tatc.s, IJ.S. Del,artment of Commerce ( 19!)3). The “capital input”
16Given a time endowment normalized to one, we choose 1 = 0.30, which implies that
households spend about one-third of their discretionary time in market work. The
fifth characteristic is the real after-tax interest rate. 23 We identify two values that are
of particular interest. One is 6.9 percent, which is the value estimated by Cooley and
Prescott (1995) using data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
The other is 4.0 percent, which is a value commonly used in macroeconomic research.
Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values that we obtain using the above
met hodology.
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
After-Tax Interest Rate













Notice that 6 is significantly higher when we calibrate to an after-tax interest rate
of 6.9 percent. As discussed in section 3.2, this means that the growth effects ~ and
~~ \l,il] be stronger under this calibration.
5 Quantitative Results
Fimlres 3 through 7 summarize the reslllts t~four quantitative experiments. To con-
struct these figures, we use eqllatif)il (24) L(J compute the growth rate under a pro-
rressi~re tax system and variolls versions of a flat tax system. On the vertical axis m
of each figure, we plot the difrercllcc ill ~r{m,l}l rates Ag, where Ag measures the
vc.rsioll of the net stock series was used for the capital data (see footnote 6). The data for VL is
(~l>talncd from the Citib.ase series GNPQ.
23Thc after-tax interest rate ? is defined l,y intrmlllcing privately issued real bonda (which exist in
zero rlet sllpp]y) into equation (2). ‘f%c first ,>rtlcr m,n[lition for bonds gives ? = exp (g – In@) – 1.increase in growth that occurs when switching from a progressive tax system to a
revenue neutral flat tax. Given our use of logarithms to define g, the first term in
equation (24) has no effect on the magnitude of Ag.
In most of our experiments, a flat tax is defined by n = O and @ = 1, consistent
with the proposal of Hall and Rabushka. However, in one experiment (figure 5), a
flat tax is defined by n = O and @ = 0.8273, i.e., there is no change in the investment
writ~off. The purpose of this exercise to identify the growth gains attributable to
changes in n versus changes in 4.
The standard deduction parameter is held fixed at a = 0.06 for all tax systems
except in one experiment (figure 6), where we allow the deduction under the flat
tax to vary over a wide range. This is done to examine the impact of a reform that
combines a lower marginal tax rate with a more generous standard deduction. Most
flat tax plans, including the proposal of Hall and Rabushka, incorporate a larger
deduction to provide features of progressivity and to limit the burden of taxes on the
poor.
In all of our experiments, we consider three different values of the parameter
~. Recall that ~ controls the intertemporal elasticity of household labor supply.
We consider the values v = { 1.333, 1.6, 6.0} , which correspond to elasticities of
~ = {3.0, 1.7. 0.2}. respectively. This range spans the vast majority of elasticity
24 For each value of ~, we calibrate the estimates obtained from empirical studies.
other parameters to maLch the Irmg-nln characteristics of U.S. data, as described in
sect ion 4.
In fibgure3, we plot Ag vmwls n for the three values of -y noted above. At the far
left of the figrlrc, we have 71= 0 Jvllicll irnplim that Ag is due solely to the change
in the write-off parameter O. Al 1his point. implementing a full investment write-off
raises growth by abollt ().~,r)p(’rccnLagc poinLs. Recall from sect ion 3.2, however,
that a more gcncr(jlls writt~off \Jr(j(illc~’slarger gains as n increases. Moreover, as nWhen n = 0.2734, the progressive tax in our model matches the steepness of the
U.S. federal tax schedule. At this point, with F = 0.1823, the marginal tax rate is
given by (n+ 1)7 = 0.2321. From equation (28), a flat tax with n = O, @ = 1, and
a = 0.06 requires a post-reform value of ? = 0.1950 to maintain revenue neutrality.
Thus, a flat tax results in a lower marginal tax rate, but requires a higher average
tax rate to pay for the more generous investment write-off.
Figure 3 shows that when n = 0.2734, the annual growth gain is between 0.509
and 0.850 percentage points, depending on the value of ~. A larger ~ implies a
smaller growth gain. This confirms the analysis of section 3.2. A larger -y means
that labor supply is less sensitive to changes in the after-tax wage, which makes ~
weaker. In switching to a flat tax, labor hours increase by only 0.9 percent (from
0.3 to 0.3027) when v = 6, but increase by 7.0 percent (from 0.3 to 0.3211) when
-y = 1.333. These results also confirm the findings of Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1995) who show that the growth effects of distortionary
taxation are sensitive to assumptions about the elasticity of household labor supply.
For the baseline value of -y = 1.6, the model predicts that a flat tax will increase
growth by 0.74 percentage points per year (from 1.80 percent to 2.54 percent). This
fiegureimplies enormous gains in output and welfare over time. For example, a growth
rate of 1.80 percent will cause G 11P per capita to double in 38.9 years, whereas a
growth rate of 2..54 percent will callsc G 111’ t{) double in only 27.6 years. In terms of
welfare, this translates into a 1(J.:Jperccrlt irlcrease in household consumption each
period —forever.23
Fi~lre 4 shmvs t}iat the grmvt}l gaixls ar(>sllbstantially smaller when the model
is calibrated to an after-tax infcrest rate (If 4.() permit. ‘l’he gains are now between
().218 and 0.365 percelltagc poil)ts. :1 ]f~~vrr irlt{’r(’st ratr implies a smaller value of 6
it) (11(’calibration. ~vtlic}l rnak(~>- aII(! + \~(~iik(’r.
2“l:rorn ( I ) arid (21), the hrmsc}IfIltl’s value fllrlcli[,rl is giwm ~Jy 1’ (b) = ~~o O’ In (boy, ) .
LJsing ( 17), (22), an[l (24), the val}lt, (Ilrit.llt,ft (:iII also Iw written a. V (k.) = H +
*+ - III Iw. w}wrv d,, ~l{Lw# “,1 -(l+ w’}-. Our Wcdfzlrerneas”m
ix ]00 {(vxI)IAI ‘ (1 – .f)l – I } wh[>r(, At is the illcrra.w, II) Iif+tilllc utility t}mt occurs when adopting
a flat tax. Sire-r- tbc initial capital st.t~k erltm> th, ,wl,rc>~i{,ri for t’ (AxI) in an additiwly separable
t Iv:ly, t I(. v:~lll(. t)f k,, {Itx-s l](~t affect f,l]r Wrlfar[. r,~rl)l)l]t:itit,rl.In figure 5, we hold the write-off parameter fixed at @ = 0.8273 and compute the
gains attributable solely to a change in the slope parameter n. At the far left of figure
5, we have Ag = O, since both tax systems are now identical when n = O. When
n = 0.2734, the gains are between 0.183 and 0.633 percentage points. When y = 1.6,
we have Ag = 0.49. Comparing this result to the value of Ag = 0.74 obtained earlier
from figure 3 shows that both features of a flat tax—the lower marginal tax rate
and the full investment write-off-are important contributors to the growth gain.
The lower marginal tax rate accounts for about two-thirds of the gain, while the full
write-off accounts for one-third.
In figure 6, we vary the standard deduction under a flat tax over a wide range. For
this experiment, the model is calibrated to an after-tax interest rate of 6.9 percent
and n = 0.2734. We plot Ag versus the ratio ~, where af and ap denote the standard
deduction parameters under a ffat tax and a progressive tax, respectively. We hold
crP fixed at 0.06 and allow af to vary from O to 0.18. As the ratio ~ increases, the
growth gains become smaller becallse revenue neutrality requires a higher post-reform
tax rate. At the far right whml ~ = 3. the post-reform tax rate is -f = 0.2348. At
this point, with -y = 1.6. the mtxiel predicts a growth gain of 0.437 percentage points.
Thus, the desired features of progrcssivity that are achieved through a more generous
standard deduct ion come al t11(’cost of sacrificed growth gains.
Finally, figure 7 plots Ag as ii fllllcti(Jn of capital?s share of output 0. Again, the
model is calibrated to an aft~’r-tax itl((~rcst rate of 6.9 percent and n = 0.2734. As
0 increases, the cent riblltiorl {jf tII<> Ial)or ill~)llt to production becomes smaller, and
the gains from adopt il]~ :; fl;it t il~ wx~ r(’(ill(mi. \Yhen O = 1.0, the link between
labor hours and gro~vtl] is ((JIIIIIl{Itl\ (li][~illate{l and a flat tax stimulates growth
only throllgh the i]l~’rstrrl(vll (lIi LIIIIf J1. III (Iiis (’:;s(>. the model predicts a growth gain
of 0.4.58 percentage poirlts.
The experiment (ic~)ic((’({ ill Iiglir( 7 J)r(,vidcs information about how our model
wt)llld pcrfor]n Iln(i(’r :iIl tilt (’~llill il”t >lJ(.(.ificzitit)Il of the human capital technology.
(){lr formulation im~)li(w t}IaI II( }11.MII( }1(1s Ilr]tl(’rirwcst in human capital relative to the
socially optimal 1(’vcI Iw(xills(’ t11(.ir11{’tisi{)]ls (If) riot take into account the learning by
‘)()doing externality. As O approaches 1.0, this externality is eliminated, but the growth
gain remains significant at 0.458 percentage points. Thus, we believe our results are
reasonably robust to alternative mechanisms for accumulating human capital.
6 Conclusion
This paper developed a simple theoretical framework to assess the growth effects of
a flat tax. The model captures the incentive effects of rising marginal tax rates on
household decisions to consume, work, and invest. These decisions,, in turn, determine
the rate of economic growth. Our model predicts that a revenue neutral flat tax can
permanent ly increase per capita growth by 0.18 to 0.85 percentage points per year
relative to a progressive system calibrated to match features of the ~’. S. federal tax
schedule.
While our model is admittedly an abstract and simplified representation of the
vastly complex U.S. tax code, we believe it provides some useful insight into the
potential benefits of currently proposed tax reforms. By imposing the discipline of
general equilibrium and revenue neutrality, we have attempted to take into account
the macroeconomic repercussions that are likely to be induced by a major overhaul
of the U.S. tax system. We expect that the model characteristics we identify as
important for determining the strength of the growth gain will also be present in
more complicated models. A more comprehensive analysis would need to explicitly
address the distributional consequences of a flat tax, since its political feasibility
depends crucially on perceptions of fairness and equal sacrifice.26
‘J”%c /lltig arid (’arlstrorn ( 1995) and Ventura ( 1996) for analyses of the distributional conse-
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